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Martin Feldstein and Jeﬀrey B. Liebman
Social Security is the largest and probably the most popular program of
the federal government. It reduces the number of the aged in poverty and
transfers more than 4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) to retired
workers, disabled workers, and their dependents. These beneﬁts are larger
than the defense budget and nearly twice as large as the transfers provided
by all of the other means-tested programs (including Medicaid, food
stamps, et.) combined. For a retiree who has always had the average level
of earnings, Social Security beneﬁts equal 42 percent of earnings in the
year before retirement. An average-earning retiree with a spouse can re-
ceive up to 63 percent of preretirement earnings, depending on the
spouse’s previous earnings. After beneﬁts begin, they are fully indexed for
inﬂation so that their real value never declines.
It will be diﬃcult but not impossible to maintain this level of generosity
in the future, when the increasing life expectancy of the population in
general and of retirees in particular will make it substantially more expen-
sive to provide such beneﬁts. Instead of the ratio of three workers per
retiree that prevails today, the demographic trend will cause the ratio to
fall to two workers per retiree, implying that a 50 percent rise in the payroll
tax rate would be needed to maintain the current rules linking beneﬁts
to preretirement earnings. The Social Security actuaries estimate that the
payroll tax for the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI)
program will eventually have to rise from the present 12.4 percent to 19.0
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1percent. The retirement of the employees born in the baby boom years
after World War II will accelerate this process, but the problem of rising
costs is not the baby boom wave of retirees but the longer-term increase in
longevity (and decline in fertility), and therefore the increase in the relative
number of retirees.
Theprojectedcost increaseshave ledto avariety of alternativeproposals
to close the gap between the projected tax receipts and beneﬁts: slowing
the growth of future beneﬁts, raising tax revenue, investing the OASDI
trust fund in private ﬁnancial assets, and shifting from a pure pay-as-you-
go (PAYGO) system to one with investment-based personal retirement ac-
counts. As the papers in this volume show, the distributional consequences
of these diﬀerent proposals vary substantially.
Researchers at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
have been engaged for several years in studying alternative Social Security
reforms, particularly reforms that would involve using investment-based
personal retirement accounts to augment the beneﬁts from PAYGO taxes.
These analyses have focused on the aggregate national eﬀects of such re-
formsa nd on the potential experience of a typical middle-income em-
ployee. The studies in the present volume go beyond the previous work by
looking at how the current system and alternative reforms would aﬀect a
variety of groups, particularly those groups who now depend on Social
Security to avoid poverty in old age: women (especially those who are
widowed or divorced at a relatively early age), workers with low education
or low earnings, and others who are less likely than average to have addi-
tional private saving or pension incomes and more likely to have irregular
employment histories.
Previous NBER Studies of Social Security Reform
Before discussing these distributional aspects of Social Security and So-
cial Security reform, it is helpful to put the current studies into the context
of the broader analysis of Social Security reform in earlier NBER studies.
Our research began with an investigation of the economic feasibility of
at r ansition from the current PAYGO system to one with either a pure
investment-based system or a mixture of PAYGO and investment-based
accounts, while providing the beneﬁts to current and future retirees that
arep romised in current law. This research included studies of the experi-
ence in a number of other countries that had successfully made such a
transition as well as detailed calculations of what would be required in the
United States. A basic conclusion of this research was that such a transi-
tion is feasible: Contributing a small additional fraction of payroll earnings
to personal retirement accounts that are invested in portfolios of stocks
and bonds would permit a gradual reduction in future PAYGO beneﬁts,
while maintaining a combined beneﬁt from the two sources that is at least
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number of countries in diﬀerent parts of the world to achieve such a transi-
tion suggested that it would be possible in practice as well as in our compu-
tations. The results of these studies are presented in Feldstein (1998). Sub-
sequent studies, including Feldstein and Samwick (1997, 1998), provide
more detailed and realistic calculations of the transition process.
This ﬁrst set of studies did not deal explicitly with the risks involved in
either the existing PAYGO system or the alternative systems that rely, at
least in part, on investment in stocks and bonds. The PAYGO system is
subject to the uncertainty created by possible ﬂuctuations in growth rates
of productivity and labor force that alter the implicit return on Social
Security PAYGO taxes. A PAYGO system is also subject to the political
uncertainty of whether future generations of taxpayers will be willing to
pay the higher taxes necessary to ﬁnance beneﬁts at a time when the rate
of return is less than that available in private pensions.1 The NBER project
presented in Campbell and Feldstein (2001) analyzed these PAYGO risks
and the risks inherent in a variety of investment-based systems. Separate
studies considered the risks if the investments were held in a single govern-
ment investment account, as well as the risks involved in individual per-
sonal retirement accounts. Based on the stochastic distribution of returns
on stocks and bonds over the past ﬁfty years, a mixed system that com-
bines PAYGO and investment-based components could be designed in a
way that would involve very little risk that retirees would receive less than
the beneﬁts projected under current law. Such a system could nevertheless
have a substantially smaller long-run total cost to future employees than
would be required in a pure PAYGO system.2
Finally, John Shoven organized a project to examine the issues involved
in administering an investment-based system and the costs of doing so
(Shoven 2000). Those studies show that the costs of managing the funds
are small relative to the potential costs involved in collecting funds from
individuals, maintaining records of individual accounts, mailing regular
account statements to investors, and answering phone calls from investors.
Goldberg and Graetz (1999) described a low-cost system of individual
accounts in which funds are collected from employers as part of the Social
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1. This political uncertainty appears to be the reason that the Roosevelt administration
originally proposed a funded system. Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau testiﬁed in 1935
to the Ways and Means Committee that “There are some who believe that we can meet this
problem as we go by borrowing from the future to pay the costs....T h e yw o u l dplace all
conﬁdence in the taxing power of the future to meet the needs as they arise. We do not share
this view. We cannot safely expect future generations to continue to divert such large sums
to the support of the aged unless we lighten the burden upon the future in other direc-
tions....W ed e s i r et oe s t a b lish this system on such sound foundations that it can be contin-
ued indeﬁnitely in the future” (Costa 1999, 173).
2. During the transition period, the total of account contributions and PAYGO taxes would
be more than under the pure PAYGO approach.Security tax but invested in privately managed individual accounts by
ﬁrms designated by employees.
Distributional Aspects: Some Key Conclusions
Thep r esent volume looks at the eﬀects of alternative Social Security
reformso navariety of population groups and examines the distributional
eﬀects of the current Social Security system. Six ﬁndings in these studies
strike us as particularly important.
First, despite the very substantial current spending of the Social Secu-
rity program, there are signiﬁcant gaps in the protection provided to the
existing elderly. Some 10.5 percent of those over age sixty-ﬁve are oﬃcially
classiﬁed as poor. Among elderly women who are widowed, divorced, or
never married, 19 percent have incomes below the poverty line. Average
beneﬁts for a retired worker are only $9,360 a year (the oﬃcial poverty
line for an elderly individual is $7,818 and is $9,863 for an elderly couple).
Second, the various means of cutting beneﬁts that have been proposed
in the political debate as alternatives to higher taxes (reducing the cost-of-
living adjustment, altering the beneﬁt formula, increasing the number of
yearsu sed in calculating average lifetime earnings, raising the retirement
age, etc.) would distribute their cuts diﬀerently, but all would have a sig-
niﬁcant adverse eﬀecto nthe standard of living of future retires.
Third, the existing system is not nearly as redistributive as the beneﬁt
formula would imply. The formula that speciﬁes higher annual beneﬁts per
dollar of contribution for those with low-average earnings is substantially
oﬀsetb ythe higher mortality rates among individuals with low levels of
income and education. The higher mortality rates mean that such individ-
uals are less likely to receive any beneﬁts, and that those who do begin to
receive beneﬁts will do so for a shorter period of time. The lack of bequests
in the PAYGO program substantially reduces the rate of return for these
high-mortality groups. The higher beneﬁts provided to the spouses of high-
income workers also reduces the progressivity of the system.
Fourth, continuing the current pure PAYGO system would mean a 7.0
percentage point increase in the current 12.4 percent payroll tax rate. This
taxplacesaparticularlyhighburdenonlow-andmiddle-incomeemployees,
forw hom it is typically larger than the income tax (because the payroll
tax has no personal exemptions or deductions). A rise in the payroll tax
rate would imply a signiﬁcant increase in the share of the overall tax bur-
den borne by low- and middle-income employees and a proportionately
larger decline in their standard of living.
Fifth, adding an investment-based system of personal retirement ac-
counts with deposits of 3 percent of payroll would increase the long-run
beneﬁts of every major demographic group, including women, blacks, and
individuals with low education. Although this system would require extra
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in the long run be less than half of the payroll tax rise required in the pure
PAYGO system.
Sixth, an investment-based system would increase the amount of capital
per worker in the economy, raising real wages and, to a lesser extent, de-
pressing the real rate of return on capital. These changes in wages and
capital returns would beneﬁt low- and middle-income employees relative
to other groups.
Indirect Eﬀects of Social Security on the Distribution of Income
Before presenting a brief summary of each of the individual studies, we
consider here the more general ways in which the current Social Security
system aﬀects the distribution of incomes. It is common in discussions of
Social Security—including most of the analyses in this volume—to as-
sume that an additional dollar of Social Security beneﬁts raises the retir-
ee’s income and consumption by a dollar. There are four major reasons
that this direct eﬀecti sa nincomplete picture of the distributional eﬀect
of the Social Security program.
First, Social Security taxes and the expectation of future Social Security
beneﬁts reduce personal saving, including employer-ﬁnanced pension sav-
ing, and therefore reduce the amount of such personal income from this
source that individuals have in retirement. If each dollar of Social Security
wealth (i.e., the present actuarial value of future Social Security beneﬁts)
reduces personal saving by approximately ﬁfty cents, a dollar of beneﬁts
raises retirement consumption by only ﬁfty cents. We know of no studies
of how this saving-oﬀset eﬀect varies among demographic groups.
Second, the Social Security program induces individuals to retire earlier
than they otherwise would (see, e.g., Gruber and Wise 1999). This reduces
the earnings of older individuals and thus oﬀsets someo fe ﬀect of the
beneﬁts on disposable income.
Third, the changes in saving and in the labor supply of individuals (both
at retirement and at earlier working ages) that are induced by Social Secu-
rity have general equilibrium eﬀects on the rate of interest and on the level
of real wages. Because the reduction in the capital stock is likely to be
proportionally greater than the reduction in the labor supply, the net eﬀect
is to reduce wages and to increase the return to capital. The study by Kot-
likoﬀ,Smetters, and Walliser in this volume analyzes this eﬀect.
Finally, Social Security is to some extent a substitute for intrafamily
transfers. To the extent that Social Security beneﬁts are oﬀset byl o w e r
transfers from working children to their retired parents, the beneﬁts raise
the consumption of the children rather than of the retirees.
These indirect eﬀects must be kept in mind when considering the eﬀects
of the Social Security program and of alternative reforms.
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Four of the individual studies in this volume deal with the distributional
aspects of the current system, two deal with reforms within the context of
the pay-as-you-go system, and four deal with the distributional aspects of
a shift to a system that includes investment-based individual retirement
accounts. The ten studies are organized in this manner in the volume as
well as in this summary.
Jeﬀrey B. Liebman considers redistribution in the current Social Secu-
rity system. He emphasizes that spouse beneﬁts and diﬀerential mortality
oﬀsetasubstantial share of the redistribution provided by the progressive
beneﬁt formula, and that families with identical lifetime earnings can re-
ceive very diﬀerent returns from Social Security. He also suggests that the
system is likely to become more progressive in the future, as cohorts in
whichw omen had higher labor force participation rates reach retirement.
Kathleen McGarry focuses on the Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
program, which provides means-tested beneﬁts for the elderly poor. She
notes that many of those who appear to be eligible for SSI beneﬁts do not
apply for them. She studies the factors that discourage eligibility and ap-
plies her analysis to estimate the eﬀects of program changes on participa-
tion and poverty. Her analysis shows that relatively small expenditures
($12 billion per year in 1993 dollars) could raise SSI beneﬁts to the poverty
level, although incomplete take-up would still leave some of the elderly
in poverty.
Although most of the studies in this volume deal with the distribution of
income, two of the chapters deal with diﬀerent aspects of the distribution
problem. Jagadeesh Gokhale and Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀ deal with the dis-
tribution of wealth. They show that by depressing saving and therefore
leaving most Americans with little or no bequeathable wealth, the Social
Security program reduces wealth—particularly among lower- and middle-
income households. The authors also note that in depressing wealth ac-
cumulation, Social Security increases the overall wealth inequality in the
country.
Angus Deaton, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, and Christina Paxson study
the way that the inequality of consumption behaves in a life-cycle model
without bequests. Social Security, by substituting PAYGO beneﬁts for ac-
tual accumulation, reduces the inequality of wealth that results from varia-
tionsi nlifetime earnings and therefore of retirement consumption that
would occur if there were greater reliance on individual saving. The con-
trast with the Gokhale-Kotlikoﬀ paper shows the important role that be-
quests can play in determining long-run wealth inequality.
Julia Lynn Coronado, Don Fullerton, and Thomas Glass use the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics to generate estimates of lifetime incomes for a
large sample of individuals, and then calculate the present value of taxes
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the net present value of beneﬁts minus taxes depends on how incomes are
measured. The current system is slightly progressive on a lifetime basis
when individuals are classiﬁed by the present value of lifetime incomes,
butb ecomes lesss ow hen incomes are deﬁned to include the value of the
leisure. The authors then use this framework to assess the eﬀects of various
pay-as-you-go reforms on the overall progressivity of the system.
Jagadeesh Gokhale and Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀ use an extensive simula-
tion model to generate lifetime incomes of current and future employees,
and use those simulated incomes to assess the eﬀects of alternative reforms
on the implicit rates of return that individuals in diﬀerent income and
demographic groups receive on their Social Security taxes. They ﬁnd that
if current rules and tax rates were feasible in the future, individuals would
get an implicit real return of slightly less than 2 percent. Because beneﬁts
must be cut or taxes raised to maintain the solvency of the system, the
actual future rates of return must be even lower. Gokhale and Kotlikoﬀ
examine the eﬀects of a variety of diﬀerent proposals on these rates of re-
turn for diﬀerent demographic and economic groups.
Martin Feldstein and Jeﬀrey B. Liebman use actual Social Security life-
time earning and beneﬁt records matched to government survey data on
ac ohorto fr etirees to study the distributional impact of a change from
the existing PAYGO Social Security system to one that combines both
PAYGOa nd investment-based components. These data have an advantage
in that the households in the sample reﬂect the full range of life experi-
ences, including irregular work histories, unusual marriage and divorce
patterns, and premature deaths. The study analyzes a system that com-
bines the beneﬁts that can be ﬁnanced by the existing payroll tax with the
annuity that could be ﬁnanced by personal retirement accounts based on
contributions equal to 3 percent of payroll. Although the mixed system
would temporarily cost more than the pure PAYGO system, in the long
run it would be substantially less expensive. More speciﬁcally, the increase
in the cost of such a mixed system relative to current PAYGO taxes would
be less than half of the rise in taxes required to maintain current beneﬁt
rules in a pure PAYGO system. Despite its lower cost, the mixed system
would give most individuals in virtually all demographic groups higher
average beneﬁts than they would receive under the current system. The
mixed system would also result in a smaller share of individuals in every
category with beneﬁts below the poverty level. These basic conclusions
remain true even if the future rate of return in the investment-based com-
ponent of the mixed system were substantially less than past experience
implies. Moreover, by funding the personal retirement accounts in a redis-
tributive manner, it is possible to have beneﬁts for all income groups rise
byas imilar percentage.
Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀ,K ent Smetters, and Jan Walliser use a computable
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system would change wages and interest rates. They conclude that an
investment-based system would help the poor both because of the higher
return on investment-based accounts and because of the increased capital
per worker in the economy.
Martin Feldstein and Elena Ranguelova examine the potential magni-
tudes of the bequests that might result in an investment-based plan under
diﬀerent rules about bequests. Permitting employees who die before retire-
ment to bequeath the assets in their personal retirement accounts would
reduce the funds available at age sixty-seven by about one-sixth, implying
that (for example) the same level of annuity could be achieved with a 3.6
percent PRA saving rate and preretirement bequests, or with a 3.0 percent
PRA with no bequest. The paper also studies a variety of possible post-
retirement bequest rules. By taking into account the uncertain nature of
the return on the PRAs, the authors study the distribution of bequest sizes
as well as their mean levels.
Jeﬀrey R. Brown analyzes the ﬁnancial redistribution that would occur
under various annuity and bequest options in an individual accounts pro-
gram. A key part of his analysis is applying mortality rates diﬀerentiated
by gender, race, ethnicity, and education level to calculate the transfers
that would take place between diﬀerent groups under diﬀerent assump-
tionsa bout the structure of the annuity program. Mandating a single life
annuity could result in much larger transfers from high-mortality groups
(such as black males) to low-mortality groups (such as white females) than
would occur if joint life annuities or bequest options were allowed.
The current U.S. Social Security system has large impacts on poverty
and on the distribution of income and wealth. The studies in this volume
highlight the importance of focusing on the distributional aspects of re-
form plans, because the distributional implications of the plans can vary
greatly depending on plan details. In addition, the studies show that with
appropriate attention to low-income groups and others at high risk of pov-
erty in old age, reforms can both reduce the long-run burden of the aging
society on future taxpayers and reduce poverty rates among the elderly.
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